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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Automobile Insurance-Permissive User Under the Omnibus Clause
In Hawley v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America' the plaintiffs
sought to fix liability upon defendant insurance company under the
"omnibus clause"2 of an automobile liability insurance policy issued
by defendant to a corporation. One plaintiff suffered personal in-
juries and the other plaintiff's property was damaged when a vehicle
owned by the latter collided with a truck owned by the corporation
and driven by its employee. The employee, who had been given
permission to use the vehicle to drive to and from work, and to keep
it overnight at his home, was using it at the time of the accident on
an entirely personal mission after returning home from work. Plain-
tiffs had recovered judgments against the employee which were un-
satisfied at the time the present action was instituted. The insurer
denied liability under the omnibus clause on the theory that the
"actual use" of the vehicle at the time of the accident was outside the
scope of the permission granted.
On appeal by defendant from an adverse judgment, the court
held that plaintiffs' evidence3 made a prima facie showing of express
permission4 for the use being made of the vehicle at the time of the
accident. However, an instruction by the trial court which assumed,
as a matter of law, that the initial permission to use the truck was
comprehensive and unlimited if specific uses were not expressly pro-
hibited was held erroneous in that it failed to place upon plaintiffs
the burden of showing, as an affirmative matter, the nature and
extent of the permission granted. The court found that the instruc-
1257 N.C. 381, 126 S.E.2d 161 (1962).
2 The policy definition of "insured" contained a clause which included
as insured any person while using the vehicle, provided the actual iuse was
with the permission of the named insured. Similar omnibus clauses are now
contained in all standard automobile liability insurance policies. See Austin,
Permissive User Under the Omnibus Clause of the Automobile Liability
Policy, 29 INs. COUNSEL J. 49 (1962).
'The court held that evidence that the employee had been instructed
only that he was not to "do too much running around with it at night"
permitted the conclusion that non-excessive use at night was authorized. The
court also held that the mere, fact that the employee was carrying riders
at the time in disobedience of instructions would not nullify such per-
mission. This is in accord with the general rule. See, e.g., Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co. v. Collins, 96 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 627
(1938).
' It is universally held that permission under the omnibus clause may be
either express or implied. 257 N.C. at 384, 126 S.E.2d at 164.
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tion, in effect, was based on the liberal, "initial permission" rule5 of
construction,6 and held that neither the omnibus clause required by
the applicable Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of 1957,'
nor the similar clause written into the policy in question,' justified the
application of this rule.'
The main difference in the construction given an omnibus clause
in other jurisdictions seems to be in "whether the permission is
confined to the time when the accident occurs or whether it is defined
as permission 'in the first instance.' "1 Under the conventional
analysis," however, the decisions are divided into three groups.
'Under this rule, the person using the vehicle is insured if he has per-
mission in the first instance, and any use while it remains in his possession is
"with permission" even though that use is for a: purpose not contemplated
by the named insured when he parted with possession. See 257.N.C. at
385, 126 S.E.2d at 165.
'In a dictum the court stated that the instruction "is not improper"
under the liberal rule, since most courts following this rule do not allow
recovery when the personal use by the employee was specifically pro-
hibited. However, the cases relied upon for this conclusion, Waits v. In-
demnity Ins. Co. of North America, 33 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 1947) and
cases therein cited, either did not apply the liberal rule, or held that there
was no initial permission for the use. The Waits case itself was reversed
by Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 215 La. 349, 40 So. 2d
746 (1949). No decisions have been found denying recovery on such
grounds while applying the liberal rule. This is to be expected since the
very rationale of the liberal rule has been said to be that public policy will
not allow the defense that the permittee went beyond the scope of his per-
mission. See Arnold v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 158 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Ind.), aff'd, 260 F.2d 161 (7th Cir. 1958). But see Hubbard v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 192 Tenn. 210, 240 S.W.2d 245 (1951). Thus the
lower court's instruction seems to be a confusing combination of the liberal
and moderate rules.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961). G.S. § 20-314 incorpo-
rates by reference the omnibus clause required by the Motor Vehicle Safety-
Responsibility Act of 1953, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2)
(Supp. 1961) ; this section provides that the policy shall insure "the person
named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor ve-
hicle ... with the express or implied permission of such named insured...."
8 See note 2 supra.
o The court had not previously adopted a specific rule of construction. In
several cases, specific exclusion clauses were given effect to bar recovery.
See, e.g., Johnston v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 200 N.C. 763, 158 S.E. 473
(1931); Holton v. Eagle Indem. Co., 196 N.C. 348, 145 S.E. 679 (1928).
Recovery has also been denied on various other'grounds. See, e.g., Miller v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 245 N.C. 526, 96 S.E.2d 860 (1957) (vehicle
involved not covered by policy).
'0 Hodges v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 66 Ga. App. 431, 435, 18 S.E.2d
28, 31, cert. denied, 316 U.S. 693 (1942). See generally Ashlock, Automobile
Liability Insurance: The Omnibus Clause, 46 IowA L. REv. 84 (1960), in
which many cases are classified on the basis of this "two rule" analysis.
11 See generally 7 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTIcE, §§ 4366-
372 (1962) [hereinafter cited as APPLEMAN]; Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d'600 (1949).
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(1) Under the strict or "conversion" rule,1" any deviation from the
time, place, or purpose specified by the person granting permission
is sufficient to take the permittee outside the coverage of the omnibus
clause. (2) Under the moderate or "minor deviation" rule,13 a
material deviation from the permission granted constitutes a use
without permission, but a slight deviation is not sufficient to exclude
the permittee from coverage. (3) Under the liberal or "initial per-
mission" rule, 4 if the permittee has permission to use the automobile
in the first instance, any subsequent use while it remains in his
possession, though not within the contemplation of the parties at the
time of the bailment, is a permissive use within the terms of the
clause.
Such a superficial analysis of the cases, however, tends to over-
loolk the often critical effect of local statutes upon the construction
given an omnibus clause by the courts. Since the clause indirectly
extends protection to members of the public injured by the negligent
operation of motor vehicles, the courts often give great weight to
considerations of public policy suggested by legislation requiring
automobile liability insurance of certain vehicle owners or operators.
In a particular case, the traditional rules of construction of insurance
policies must be balanced against these considerations of public
policy.15
A few states require all 6 or some' 7 automobile liability policies
to contain a statutory omnibus clause. In most jurisdictions, how-
ever, the parties are generally free to include an omnibus clause of
their choice and to make it as broad or narrow in scope as they
12 See, e.g., Gray v. Sawatzki, 291. Mich. 491, 289 N.W. 227 (1939);
Cypert v. Roberts, 169 Wash. 33, 13 P.2d 55 (1932).
a See, e.g., Dickinson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 101 Conn. 369, 125 Ad.
866 (1924); Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 88 P.2d 356(1939).
1' See, e.g., Parks v. Hall, 189 La. 849, 181 So. 191 (1938); Matits v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 NJ. 488, 166 A.2d 345 (1960); Stovall v.
New York Indem. Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W.2d 473 (1928). For an ex-
cellent discussion of the problems raised by the Matits case see Cohen &
Cohen, Automobile Liability Insurance: Public Policy and the Oimnibus
Clause in New Jersey. 15 RUTGERs L. REv. 155 (1961).
15 See generally 7 AP.PLEMAN § 4343 and Ashlock, op. cit. supra note 10,
at 86-90, for cases applying statutory provisions.
" See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-4309 (1953).
" See, e.g,, IowA CODE ANN. § 321A.21 (2) (b) (Supp. 1962); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2) (Supp. 1961). These are typical of statutes re-
quiring an omnibus clause only in those policies furnished as proof of
financial security following accidents, etc.
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wish."8 Thus it is not surprising to find that a majority of courts19
have held that the parties had no intent to adopt the "hell and high
water""0 liberal rule. However, in the comparatively few instances
where, as in the principal case, statutes require that a particular
omnibus clause be included in the policy, most courts have taken
the view that the clause should be liberally construed in favor of the
injured plaintiff.2
Although North Carolina has required various statutory omnibus
clauses since 1931,' no cases have been found in which the court has
attempted to construe one of these clauses. In Hooper v. Maryland
Cas. Co.,23 the only case in -this jurisdiction in which an omnibus
clause had to be interpreted, the statutory clause was apparently not
applicable and was not mentioned in the opinion. The court in that
case expressly declined to adopt any one of the rules of construction,
but its decision seems to follow the pattern of the strict or moderate
rule jurisdictions. 4
In recent years, several statutes25 designed to increase the prob-
ability that innocent traffic victims will receive compensation have
18 See, e.g., McCann v. Continental Cas. Co., 8 Ill. 2d 476, 134 N.E.2d
302 (1956) (covered only named insured and relatives in his household).
"s See, e.g., Hodges v. Ocean Acc. & Guai. Co., 66 Ga. App. 431, 18
S.E.2d 28, cert. denied, 316 U.S. 693 (1942); Gulla v. Reynolds, 151 Ohio
St. 147, 85 N.E.2d 116 (1949).
"0 The "hell and high water" appellation, with its inflammatory connota-
tions, is often used by courts which, like the court in the principal case, wish
to reject the liberal rule. It was probably originated by Appleman, a sharp
critic of the rule. See 7 APPLEMAN § 4366, at 308.
"See, e.g., O'Roak v. Lloyds Cas. Co., 285 Mass. 532, 189 N.E. 571
(1934).
" N.C. SEss. LAWS 1931, ch. 116, § 12(2) provided that piolicies issued
thereunder "shall insure the insured named therein and any other person
using . . . any such motor vehicle with the consent, express or implied, of
such insured . . .
'233 N.C. 154, 63 S.E.2d 128 (1951).
"By affirming a non-suit against the plaintiff on the grounds that
he had not shown that the permission given the employee to use his em-
ployer's truck to drive to and from work extended to use for other personal
purposes, it seems that the decision applied the "scope of permission" test
of the strict or moderate rule. Since this decision there have been several
decisions by federal courts applying North Carolina law which seem to
follow the strict or moderate rule. See, e.g., Williams v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
265 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1959).
25See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-71.1 (Supp. 1961) (presumption that
operator is agent of owner); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -.39 (Supp.
1961) (broader financial responsibility law); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-280
(1953) (taxicab operators must prove financial responsibility); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 20-281 to -284 (Supp. 1961) (vehicle lessors and renters must
obtain insurance); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-194.1 (Supp. 1960) (requiring
insurance for state-owned vehicles)-.
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been enacted in this state. Among these is the Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Act of 1957.26 With the enactment of this
statute North Carolina became the third state2 to require proof
of financial responsibility as a condition precedent to the registration
of motor vehicles. This act provided that automobile liability policies
presented as proof must contain the statutory omnibus clause. If
such a clause is not inserted, it will be read into the policy by the
court.2" In view of these recent expressions of a legislative intent
to reduce the number of uncompensated automobile accident victims,
it could have been predicted with some degree of confidence that
the court would, given a proper case, adopt the liberal rule in con-
struing the statutory omnibus clause in a policy issued in compliance
with the 1957 act. With only the relatively weak precedent of the
Hooper case to overcome, the court could have pointed out the
obvious advantages offered by the liberal rule in effectuating the
legislative policy. 9
Perhaps this result would have been reached in the principal
case30 had the court not determined, by a rather strained interpreta-
tion of the statutory omnibus clause, that the legislative intent was
to require no more "radical" coverage than that expressed by the
moderate rule. The court pointed out that the omnibus clause in
the superseded Motor Vehicle Safety and Responsibility Act of
1947"' was broad enough to embrace the liberal rule in that it
required coverage' of anyone "in lawful possession" of the vehicle.
=' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1961).
27 Massachusetts enacted the first such legislation in 1925. See MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 90, §§ 34A-34J (1959), as amended, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.
90, §§ 34A-34K (Supp. 1961); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 113A-113J(1959), as amended, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 113A, 113D (Supp.
1961). New York enacted a similar law in 1956. See N.Y. VEI rCLE AND
TRAFFIc LAW §§ 310-321.
"8 Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d, 482
-(1960).
"1Cf. Matits v. Natiofiwide Mut. Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 488, 166 A.2d 345
(1960), by which New Jdrsey became the latest state to adopt the liberal
rule. The rule was chosen in this case because of its advantages in carrying
out the legislative policy incfkated by the trend toward stronger financial
'responsibility legislation.
" The eourt in the Hawley case noted that due to the widespread enact-
menit of financial responsibility and compulsory insurance laws, there was a
decided t-end in the courts toward liberal c6rnstruction of omnibus clauses.1 3 -N.C. SEss. LAws 1947; ch. 1006, §§ 1-59. Section 4(2) (b) of this
act. provided that every 'owner's l ficy shall insure "the person named,
4nd any other:person using_ . . the motor vehicle with the permission, 'ex-pressed or implied, of 'the, named insured,'-or any other person in lawful
"ossesson.l..' (Emphasis added.) '
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Since the phrase "or any other person in lawful possession" was
deleted from the omnibus clause required by the Motor Vehicle
Safety-Responsibility Act of 1953,32 the court reasoned that this
indicated an intention on the part of the legislature to reject the
liberal rule.33  This argument, however, overlooks the more likely
explanation that the legislature was simply acting to bring our
financial responsibility law back into line with the uniform legislation
enacted in. other jurisdictions.3 4 Indeed, if the true intent was to
preclude the adoption of the liberal rule by our court, it is highly
unlikely that the legislature would have utilized the very language
often construed in other jurisdictions as expressing the liberal rule.
In any event, before attributing an intent to the legislature to so
restrict the coverage of a policy required by such a remedial statute,
the court should have required more cogent evidence.35
The court could have found more persuasive evidence of the
intended meaning of the current statutory omnibus clause by ex-
amining the background of the 1957 act. This act was copied with
slight modification from the comparable statute enacted in New York
s See note 7 supra.
"The court apparently overlooks the possibility that the phrase "or any
other person in lawful possession" might be construed as providing coverage
in situations where even the liberal rule courts would refuse to find the
insurer liable. Such a situation might be one in which the owner had bailed
the vehicle for storage and the bailee did not have even an implied initial
permission to use the vehicle on the highway. The deletion of the phrase,
to eliminate the possibility'of such a construction, would be consistent with
an intention to limit coverage to that provided by the liberal rule.
"The first motor vehicle financial responsibility legislation in North
Carolina, enacted in 1931, was based upon the model Safety-Responsibility
Act developed by the American Automobile Association in 1928. See 9
N.C.L. REv. 384 (1931). The model act was later incorporated into the
Uniform Vehicle Code as the Uniform Motor-Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act (1934). Section 23(a)(3) of this act provided that the policy "shall
insure the person named therein and any other person using . . . said motor
vehicle . . -. with the express or implied permission of the said insured."
This omnibus clause was essentially the same as that required by the 1931
North Carolina legislation. See note 22 supra. The 1947 act departed
from the uniform act in many ways, including the addition to the omnibus
lause of the phrase "or any other person in lawful possession." See note
31 supra. The 1953 act, however, is modeled after the uniform legislation,
and the 1953 omnibus clause construed by the court in the principal case is
identical to that required-by the revised UNIFORM MOTOR-VEHICLE SAFETY
REsPONSIBm-ITY' Act § 21 (b)2 -(1952).
" After construing the statutory clause the court held that the provision
in 'the policy that the "actual use" must be. with permission indicated the
intention of the parties to limit the coverage to use within the scope of 'the
permission granted.- A 'majority of -the courts applying the mciderate rule
have interpreted this type of omnibus clause in the same manner. Seec ses
cifed in 7 APPLEMAIx §4354; a ii-.58. ; -- '" -- "
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in 1956.8" The New York legislation was, in -turn, a broader
version of the 1925 Massachusetts compulsory insurance statute. 7
The wording of the omnibus clause required in North Carolina" in
the compulsory policy is quite similar to the earlier Massachusetts
act. 9 Since the New York courts had apparently not construed the
comparable omnibus clause required by its new act before the North
Carolina statute was enacted; well-known principles of statutory con-
struction4° would suggest that our court should have examined the
construction given the Massachusetts clause by the courts of that
state. Such an examination would have -revealed that the Massachu-
setts court applies the liberal rule wheni construing the compulsory
omnibus clause." However, where there is inserted in the policy in
addition to the compulsory clause a voluntary clause, similar to that
relied on by the insurer in the principal case, the court applies the
strict rule to the extent that the policy coverage is greater than the
statutory amount.42
In selecting the liberal rule to construe the statutory omnibus
clause, the Massachusetts court reasoned in ohe case43 that:
The full benefit of the compulsory security and of the provision
precluding avoidance by default of the owner will be lost, if
violations of rules of conduct laid down by an owner to be
observed by such as he permits to use his motor vehicle upon
86 See Faizan v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 47, 118 S.E.2d 303
(1961). New York decisions were utilized in this case as an aid in con-
struing the North Carolina statute.
rT See Netherton & Nabhani, The New York Motor Vehicle Financial
Security Act of 1956, 5 Am. U.L. REv. 37 (1956), in which a detailed com-
parison of the New York and Massachusetts laws is made.
8 See statutes cited note 7 supra.
89 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 175, § 113A(1) (1959) requires that the policy
provide coverage for "any other person . . . while legally using . . . such
motor vehicle . . . provided that such use is with the permission of the
named assured."
"°A statute adopted from another state will be presumed to have been
adopted with the construction placed on it by the courts of that state before
its adoption. Such construction will generally be followed if sound and
reasonable and in harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws
of the adopting- jurisdiction, on the subject. Where courts of the foreign
state have not construed the law, decisions of the courts of the state from
which the statute was originally adopted will be considered. See generally
82 C.J.S Statutes § 372 (1953).
" See, e.g., Blair v.. Travelers Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 285, 192 N.E. 467(1934).1 'See, e.g., Blair v. Travelers Ins. Co., 291 Mass. 432, 197 N.E. 60
(1935).
"Guzenfield v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 286 Mass. 133, 190 N.E. 23 (1934),
[Vol. 41
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our ways are held to defeat an injured person's enforcement
of the policy by destroying the owner's consent to the use. 4
A recent North Carolina case45 followed the reasoning of the Massa-
chusetts court as to the provision precluding avoidance by default
by the owner. In the North Carolina case, the insurer pleaded
certain policy violations by the insured after the accident is a
defense to a suit on a compulsory policy, contending that the non-
forfeiture provisions of the 1953 act did not apply to a policy issued
under the 1957 act. In disallowing this defense, the court held that,
as to the compulsory coverage provided by a motor vehicle liability
policy, no violation of the policy would defeat or avoid said policy
"T6 bar -recovery because of such a violation, the court argued, would
"practically nullify the statute by making the enforcement of the
rights of the person intended to be protected dependent upon the
acts of the very person who caused the injury."46  However, as to
coverage in excess of or in addition to the coverage specified, such
violation would constitute a valid and complete defense. Thus,
the Massachusetts solution 'to the problem of coverage under the
omnibus clause would seem to be in harmony with the view our
court has taken as to the effect of the' non-forfeiture provision of
the statute. The Massachusetts rule of construction is designed to
do justice both to the contracting parties and to the public. It
should have been adopted by the North Carolina court as being in
accordance with the public policy of this state.
The effect of the Hawley decision will undoubtedly be to render
coverage uncertain in many cases, foster litigation as to the existence
or extent of any alleged deviation, and ultimately to inhibit the
achievement of the legislative goal of broader coverage. Because this
decision seems to be in sharp conflict with the policy underlying the
1957 act, the legislature should seriously consider amending the act
to express its intent in this matter more clearly.
GEORGE M. BEASLEY, III
" Id. at 136, 190 N.E. at 24.
" Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116 S.E.2d 482
(1960).
" Id. at 126, 116 S.E.2d at 487. .In Lane v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C.
319, 128 S.E.2d 398 (1962), the court extended Swain and held that the
non-forfeiture provisions of the act apply even to assigned risk policies.
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